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Trademark Law in the Time of Kulturkampf: The 
Poirean Perspective 
Kali Murray* 
This Article explores what is termed the “Poirean Perspective,” which is an 
examination of Professor Marc Poirier’s seminal work in the relationship of 
property theory to the formation of social identity.  The Poirean Perspective offers 
three key insights on the relationship of property and intellectual property law to 
conflicts over social identity. First, the Poirean Perspective suggests how 
theoretical conceptions of community in property theory need to capture how 
different theoretical and practical contingencies impact doctrinal formation in 
property law. Second, the Poirean Perspective suggests that legal and social 
conflict over property rights in group identity may ripen into Kulturkampf, 
given the disruptions in social status such conflicts generate.  Finally, the 
Poirean Perspective explores how a type of group-identity in trademarks, called 
community brands, is likely to lead to Kulturkampf controversies in intellectual 
property law. This Article concludes by applying the Poirean Perspective to the 
current controversy over racially stigmatized trademarks such as the Washington 
Redskins. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Marc Poirier was a generous man.  It was always a relief to see Marc 
at an academic conference.  Marc would interrupt you with a chuckle 
to tell you to sharpen that thesis or huddle with you in a corner to 
laugh at all sorts of academic tomfoolery. 
Once, Marc came to speak at my invitation at Marquette.  This 
lecture was intended to be a short one-day visit.  It was, however, 
February in Milwaukee and so inevitably, it snowed.  I, for once, was 
delighted by the snow in Milwaukee as this meant that Marc would have 
to stay for an additional three days.  At leisure, Marc and I conversed 
about so many topics: the availability of a decent pho in Milwaukee, 
the false boundaries between the academic communities of property 
law and intellectual property law, and the futility of faculty politics.  
One conversation between Marc and I stands out amongst our many 
conversations that week.  In this conversation, we spoke about how his 
practice of Buddhism grounded him during a long fight with cancer. 
This last conversation revealed to me a different Marc, comfortable in 
the spiritual practice that provided him with the strength of his last 
years. 
Indeed, my truest insight into the source of Marc’s generosity 
came on the day of his lecture. Somewhat unexpectedly, Marc 
requested that I show him our chapel.  He then asked for some time 
to sit there without sound.  My fondest memory of Marc is walking away 
as he sat in solitude, still.  It is a memory that I return to again and 
again as I confront his death and our loss. 
This Symposium, albeit in a small way, allows us to celebrate the 
lasting generosity of his ideas.  Marc was a creative, omnivorous 
scholar, who wrote in environmental law, property law, intellectual 
property law, critical race theory, and critical gender theory.  He 
infused this legal scholarship with critical perspectives drawn from 
political philosophy, gender and sexual orientation studies, critical 
geography, history and sociology, just to name a few.  This Symposium 
with many different voices is a fine way to celebrate Marc’s legacy, given 
his contributions to numerous scholarly fields. 
This Article will focus on Marc’s contributions to the fields of 
property and intellectual property theory, which I refer to collectively 
as the Poirean Perspective.  The Poirean Perspective, in sum, contends 
the doctrinal formation1 of property and intellectual property law 
 
 1  The term “doctrinal formation” refers to two key concepts.  First, it refers 
specifically to the doctrinal content of an area and its constituent elements, including 
constitutional law, statutory law, and common law.  Second, it refers to the ways in such 
a doctrine is formed, whether through administrative, legislative, judicial, or social 
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occurs through a series of historically and contingent dialogues 
between a range of actors that implicate deeply held ideological 
norms, cultural beliefs, and communicative actions.2 
Two normative claims are key to the Poirean Perspective.  Initially, 
the Poirean Perspective argues that a thick conception of “community” 
is necessary when we contemplate the interaction of property doctrine, 
institutions, and actors.  For Marc, property law was made in, on, and 
around the ground, and consequently then, property law and its legal 
institutions need to be flexible and agile to be responsive to these 
contingent events.  A true insight of the Poirean Perspective is that 
property law is always reacting to the choices made by actors 
confronted by significant moral dilemmas over the best allocation of 
limited resources. 
Additionally, the Poirean Perspective claims that certain conflicts 
in property law are often heightened as these conflicts reflect the 
participants’ beliefs in competing moral claims that might be difficult 
to resolve in a clear-cut manner.  Marc referred to this process as 
Kulturkampf3 and his use of Kulturkampf emerged out of the ongoing 
legal conflicts that occurred within the last twenty years as to the legal 
status associated with sexual orientation.  These controversies—which 
included whether free-speech claims should be applied to the 
discriminatory exclusion of individuals based on sexual orientation 
and whether state sanctioned marital relationships should be available 
to any individual, regardless of sexual orientation4—provided Marc a 
 
activism.  Kali Murray, Constitutional Patent Law: Principles and Institutions, 93 NEB. L. 
REV. 901, 911 (2015) (discussing the concept of doctrinal formation within the context 
of patent law).  
 2  Id. at 911. 
 3  See Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 L. & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL 
& TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 271, 299 (2003) [hereinafter Poirier, Hastening the 
Kulturkampf]. 
 4  Id. at 299; see also Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the 
Kulturkampf: Why Federalism is Not The Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 387 
(2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage]; Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of 
Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. 
& SOC. JUST. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Microperformances of Identity]; Marc R. 
Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L. REV. 307 
(2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space]; Marc R. Poirier, The 
Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 343 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim]; Marc R. Poirier, Name 
Calling: Identifying Stigma and the “Civil Union”/”Marriage” Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1425 (2009); Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage 
Equality in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris A Dead-End or Just A Detour, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 
291 (2006) [hereinafter Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage 
Equality]; Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in United States v. Windsor: Power, 
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way to explore how both sides used the vocabulary of property law to 
articulate profoundly different moral visions of social change in this 
area. 
Both of these concepts, contingent community and Kulturkampf, 
by themselves would be innovative.  The concepts, when coupled 
together, are powerful.  Each allows us to examine why certain conflicts 
over property resources can develop into seemingly unresolvable 
controversies, while simultaneously suggesting how legal doctrine can 
provide tentative methods for solving these seemingly unresolvable 
crises.  Marc’s primary claim that questions raised by an ongoing 
Kulturkampf in our political discourse is salient as we address what 
appears to be a nation deeply divided over numerous moral questions, 
prompted by questions of shifting status of groups, including the civil 
and political rights granted to those individuals on the basis of sexual 
orientation and the status of immigrants-citizen in a globalized 
economy. 
This Article undertakes two tasks.  Part I will first review the basic 
premises of the Poirean Perspective.  Part II will then describe how 
Marc applied the Poirean Perspective to a current controversy: the use 
of potentially disparaging trademarks under Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act of 1946,5 which has been implicated in a number of 
naming controversies involving racial identities and now is the subject 
of a constitutional challenge at the United States Supreme Court.6  
Specifically, Part III uses Marc’s insights on what he terms community 
brands to emphasize the ways in which these racially stigmatized 
trademarks show the interrelationship of property and intellectual 
property theory. 
From this analysis, the Article concludes with three primary 
claims.  First, the Poirean Perspective suggests that a “thick 
conception” of community offers a systematic method of analyzing the 
doctrinal formation of property and intellectual property law.  Second, 
the Poirean Perspective offers insight on how Kulturkampf crises 
emerge over the emergent group-identity claims to social status 
property.  Finally, the Article concludes that the Poirean Perspective is 
useful in tackling how intellectual property law may address questions 
of race and community in trademark law in a more intelligible manner. 
 
Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 935 (2014). 
 5  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2016). 
 6  Lee v. Tam, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 30 (No. 15-1293) (writ of certiorari granted).   
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I.  THE POIREAN PERSPECTIVE IN PROPERTY LAW 
In this Part, the Article considers two concepts which, taken 
together, can be said to constitute the Poirean Perspective.  First, this 
section will explore Marc’s “thick” conception of community and its 
impact on property theory, with a particular focus on its relationship 
to progressive property theory.  Community in the Poirean Perspective 
serves as the “medium through which any property and/or natural 
resources is conceptualized and approached.”7 Community, 
consequently, is a “thick” concept in Poirean theory, serving to explain 
three interlocking concepts: ideas, frames, and mediums.  Community, 
for Marc, was an ongoing dialogue between potentially competing 
theoretical conceptions of rights.8  This ongoing dialogue over ideas 
could be complicated by the fact that different social, cultural and 
economic groups could have very different “frames” by which they 
could view property resources.9  Managing the dialogue between ideas, 
or the conflict over diverse frames, however, could be resolved by use 
of communicative mediums—law and other strategies—that could be 
used to achieve imperfect, but socially vital outcomes.10 
Second, this section will explore Marc’s reliance on a theory of 
Kulturkampf to explain how change can occur within the context of 
property law.  For Marc, Kulturkampf, the “unrestrained political and 
cultural combat motivated by moral righteousness[] with the 
understanding that something vital for the survival of society is at 
stake,”11 offered a compelling normative claim as to why particular 
conflicts over property resources such as real property, environmental 
goods, intellectual property, and cultural property are subject to 
intense political, social, and legal controversy.  The innovation of 
Marc’s attention is not simply his reliance on Kulturkampf, a concept 
explored by other legal theorists.  Rather, Marc detailed specific 
mechanisms that demonstrate how Kulturkampf is driven by visibility 
conflicts over specific places and spaces.  In this way, the process of 
Kulturkampf impacts property law and its institutions. 
 
 7  Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 298. 
 8  Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 43, 66 
(1997) [hereinafter Poirier, Property, Environment, Community].  This is an early work in 
the Poirean Perspective, but it contains the most complete description of the role of 
community as a normative concept in Marc’s scholarly works. 
 9  Id. at 66. 
 10  Id. at 68. 
 11  Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 299.  
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A. Community in the Poirean Perspective 
Initially, Marc used the term “community” as a vehicle to address 
how normative ideas function in property law and theory.  For Marc, 
property law and theory, in its theoretical dimensions, often devolved 
into arguments over two sharply binary “theor[ies] of the particular 
rights”12 associated with a given property claim: the claim of the 
individual property owner measured against the claim made by the 
broader community, a set of claims that could be invoked in different 
ways, including “the human values” of the progressive property 
movement13 or the “environmental jeremiad” (a key trope of the 
environmental law movement that emphasized the overarching 
regulatory necessity of protecting the environment in light of its 
potential disappearance).14 
The Poirean Perspective, however, rejected this rigid binary 
between these definitions of property rights.  Instead, Marc claimed 
that these two formative conceptions were always in a dialogue with 
each other within a legal discourse.  For instance, discussing the 
specific conflict between individual property owners’ claims and 
communal claims in environmental law, Marc noted that: 
[W]e must also seek to understand how the ideas reflected 
in the property encomium and the environmental jeremiad 
interact, express, and reproduce themselves in our culture.  
Although the property encomium and the environmental 
jeremiad often employ static, quasi-Platonic figures of private 
ownership and government regulation, in reality they are 
dynamic.  Students of property law as it is put into practice 
will often find a lability, a dialectic, between its individual-
regarding and social-good oriented modes of operation.15 
Property law, according to Marc, can work effectively when it seeks 
“the cracks” between these different conceptions of property rights. 
Consequently, the Poirean Perspective suggests that it is 
important to pay attention to those legal doctrines that attempt to 
manage these binary theoretical norms.  To develop his thesis, Marc 
examined one particular factual scenario: determining what the best 
legal approach for addressing those circumstances in which a 
 
 12  LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 19 
(2003).  Laura Underkuffler defines an important dimension of property as the 
theoretical dimension.  The theoretical dimension of rights “describes the theory of 
the particular rights that is used for any particular conception of property.”  Id. 
 13  Gregory Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
743, 743–44 (2008). 
 14  Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, supra note 8, at 45. 
 15  Id. at 45. 
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landowner is denied entirely the ability to use a portion of his or her 
property by a regulation, and whether such denial is a constitutional 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.16  For Marc, the two predominant 
approaches failed to fully mediate between the competing claims of 
the owner and the regulatory actor.  Neither the regulatory oriented 
approach embodied by the United States Supreme Court (“the 
Supreme Court”) in Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. City 
of New York17 or the individual property oriented approach, embodied 
by the United States in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council18 would 
have solved the problem.  Penn Central claimed that taking 
jurisprudence did not apply at all to different segments of the 
property, while Lucas did not resolve exactly how to determine the 
economic value of the segmented portions.19  Rather, Marc claimed 
that “the test ought to be whether the private property owner on the 
one hand and the regulatory agency on the other have acted 
reasonably in negotiating the transition in use.  Either side can, in the 
words of Justice Holmes, go ‘too far.’”20 
The Poirean Perspective, thus, seeks a dialogical balance between 
binary conceptions of property law.  While the aims of the Poirean 
Perspective are consistent with the progressive property movement, 
which sought to restore what it perceived to be an imbalance between 
the claims of the individual property owner and competing communal 
demands, it is also surprising in its innovations.  First, the Poirean 
Perspective grants a surprisingly sympathetic view to the demands of 
the individual property owner insofar as it grants such claims equal 
weight in the dialogue.  Second, the Poirean Perspective suggests that 
the law’s task was not to definitely resolve this dialogic tension between 
the claims of the individual property owner and competing demands, 
but instead to serve to mediate these claims.  This claim, of course, 
implies that legal institutions themselves could be reformed in 
different ways to encourage an ongoing mediation process.  For 
instance, Marc suggested the legal test which examined the parties’ 
“reasonable negotiations” within the takings context shifted the 
judicial decision-maker’s focus from the competing demands of the 
respective parties, to whether the taking process itself was conducted 
in an appropriate manner.21 
 
 16  Id. at 76–77. 
 17  Id. at 77 (citing Penn. Cent. Trans. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). 
 18  Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)). 
 19  Id. 
 20  Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, supra note 8, at 80. 
 21  Id. 
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Community has a second meaning in the Poirean Perspective in 
addition to its description of the dialogic tension between diverse 
ideological norms.  In its second meaning, the term “community” for 
Marc offered a way to describe how property conflicts over intangible 
and tangible resources are “framed” by different cultural conceptions 
of property.22  The Poirean Perspective insists that different social, 
cultural, and ethnic groups could view property law, in its basic forms, 
rules, and institutions, in radically different ways.  Specifically, for 
example, Marc pointed to how in colonial New England, English 
colonists and Native Americans brought very different views to the 
appropriate uses of land, with the accompanying negative 
consequence that these two different cultural groups failed to 
understand each other’s behavior.23 
For Marc, recognizing the importance of cultural frames served 
two key purposes in the Poirean Perspective.  Initially, the existence of 
different cultural frames may complicate unitary understandings of a 
theory of rights in property law.  The Poirean Perspective sees that 
different cultural frames may be necessary to interrogate what is 
“private property” or “community regulation” in any given 
circumstance.  How slaves in the southern United States viewed private 
property ownership is an interesting example of how the question of 
“cultural frames” can aid in the interrogation of the dominant theory 
of rights.  Although slaves were not able to legally own property within 
the formal legal system, historians such as Dylan Penningroth24 have 
noted how informal practices permitted slaves to maintain and trade a 
range of different properties.  Penningroth, for instance, has noted, 
“[t]he fact that slaves owned property opens up new perspectives on 
American history.  It broadens our attention beyond the master-slave 
relationship to consider how relations among the slaves might have 
shaped what slaves did with their property, how they earned it, and how 
they were able to own it.”25  The unsettling paradox of whether slaves 
 
 22  The literature on “frames” and their relationship to social relationships is 
extensive.  See, e.g., Robert Benford & David Snow, Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 611, 614–615 (2000).  
Here, I adopt a definition advanced by Dennis Chong who defines a “common frame 
of reference” as an interpretation of an issue that has been popularized through 
discussion. Dennis Chong, Creating Common Frames of Reference, in POLITICAL PERSUASION 
AND ATTITUDE CHANGES 196 (Diana Motz et al. eds., 1996).  The definition captures, in 
particular, how the Poirean Perspective “cultural frames” mix formal elements of legal 
understanding with more informal attitudes towards property acquisition and 
ownership.  
 23  Id. at 67.  
 24  DYLAN PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK 78 (2003).  
 25  Id.   
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could be said to “own” property when they had no legal personality 
suggests the ways in which understanding the relevant cultural frame 
for any given set of circumstances complicates further how we 
understand what are the “rights of the property holder” or what is the 
relevant “communal” claim. 
Additionally, Marc’s initial insight into the importance of distinct 
cultural frames in property debates was furthered by his later insistence 
on the theoretical importance of Kulturkampf.  Kulturkampf posits a 
moment in property interactions during which more diffuse cultural 
frames have hardened into distinct moral positions.  A concrete 
example of this process has occurred with the dispute over building a 
pipeline through the Standing Rock reservation.26  What may have 
begun as a relatively local dispute over whether a company could build 
a pipeline on a reservation, has generated conflict because it involves 
very different cultural frames as to the appropriate use of the property, 
and thus, consequently has hardened into a property conflict that 
invokes distinct moral positions.27 
Finally, the Poirean Perspective utilizes the term “community” to 
describe the ways in which law can perform to mediate the dialogic 
tensions posed by the different ideological and cultural tensions posed 
in property law.  For Marc, law served an important function as a 
communicative medium, given its ability to serve as a common 
vocabulary within a dynamic environment.28  Throughout his 
scholarship, Marc outlined different types of legal frameworks, which 
enabled law to serve as a communicative medium.  A useful example 
of law serving its function of communicative medium is the balanced 
negotiations between landowners and communities under the 
Endangered Species Act.29 
Two themes emerge from this third meaning of community in the 
Poirean Perspective.  First, the claim that law serves as a communicative 
medium bears a close resemblance to noted German philosopher, 
Jürgen Habermas’ claim that legal norms can serve a socially 
integrative function in reconciling diverse ideological and cultural 
names.30  The relationship of the Poirean Perspective to the works of 
 
 26  Carla Javier, A Timeline of the Year of Resistance at Standing Rock, FUSION (Dec. 21, 
2016), http://fusion.net/story/372387/timeline-nodapl-protests-standing-rock/. 
 27  Jack Healy, The View from Two Sides of the Standing Rock Front Lines, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/standing-rock-front-
lines.html?_r=0. 
 28  Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, supra note 8, at 68–69. 
 29  Id. at 69–70. 
 30  See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).  A 
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Jürgen Habermas is an interesting one insofar as Marc’s early 
scholarship did not rely on his philosophical framework.  His later 
scholarship, however, utilized two primary concepts derived from 
Habermas: the relationship between the private sphere and the public 
sphere in the constitution of social identity, as well as the claim that 
discursive spaces are necessary for the emerging visibility of social 
minorities.31 
Second, the claim that law functions to reconcile the clashing 
ideological norms and cultural frames once again emphasizes the 
Poirean Perspective’s normative reliance on institutions and rules that 
permit flexible, contingent reasoning to resolve conflict.  For Marc, 
legal rules that can manage to incorporate significant geographical 
information as to a property dispute, or how different communities 
experience the social change associated with the increased visibility of 
same-sex marriage, could be successful in reconciling the strains such 
rules may cause within in a given local community. 
In such a way, the Poirean Perspective stresses that sympathy over 
why a “losing side” in a conflict that disrupts property rules should be 
taken seriously in the judicial and legislative arena.  Sympathy is an 
unusual element of legal theory.  For Marc, sympathy, for instance, as 
to why a traditionalist may want to assert that same-sex marriage was 
disruptive32 to the historical meaning of marriage was as necessary as 
any legal solution was created.  While this sympathy should, perhaps, 
not extend to preventing the suggested change, such sympathy 
increased the political legitimacy of any judicial or legislative action 
taken in regard to the disruption in property rights at issue. 
Ultimately, the Poirean Perspective offers a rich, thick conception 
of community that is useful to property theory, generally, and 
progressive property theory, specifically.  Progressive property theory, 
and its ideological commitments, has been interested in interrogating 
the idea of “community” to complicate the relationship of the private 
property owner to larger social interests, contending that property law 
and its institutions should be shaped by an awareness of “the 
underlying human values that property serves and the social 
relationships it shapes and reflects.”33  The Poirean Perspective of 
 
fundamental insight of Habermasian theory is that law serves as a communicative, a 
kind of “transmission belt” that transforms the resemblance of everyday social 
interaction into an abstracted binding form.  Id. at 278–79.  Notably, Marc did not 
directly reference Habermas in this instance, but it is clear that Marc in his later works 
did rely substantially on Habermasian discourse theory, and so I note his theory. 
 31  See, e.g., Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402–03. 
 32  Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 361–68. 
 33  See generally Alexander et al., supra note 13. 
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community is unique, however, in the way that it complicates the 
progressive property claim, by focusing on how the contingent acts of 
specific actors “on the ground” are necessary for the evolution of 
property law. 
Specifically, by focusing on contingent motivation behind 
individual actions, the Poirean Perspective complicates the relatively 
unitary claim of community in progressive property theory, by 
exploring certain historical, social, and geographical circumstances.  
While other progressive property theorists have been interested in this 
as a dimension of property decision-making, the Poirean Perspective 
contends that legal reasoning in property law should incorporate 
contingency as a key element that shapes legal rules and related 
institutions.  A focus on contingency necessarily shifts normative 
debate as to, for instance, why exclusion is the central motivation for 
the construction of property ownership.  Accounting for contingency 
in property theory, then, leads us not only to, as Carol Rose discusses 
it, “mud”34 in our legal rules, but our legal theory as well. 
B. Kulturkampf in the Poirean Perspective 
The second key element, Kulturkampf, in the Poirean Perspective, 
is a further elaboration on the deeply contextual approach in the 
Poirean conception of community.  Kulturkampf, in its shorthand, 
refers to a potentially unresolvable “cultural war” between two 
competing perspectives. 
The Poirean Perspective introduced two key innovations in the 
theory of Kulturkampf.  First, the Poirean Perspective linked the 
concept of Kulturkampf to debates over the relationship of status of a 
type of property category.  Second, the Poirean Perspective specifically 
outlined diverse mechanisms that prompted the emergence of 
Kulturkampf in property disputes.  Marc’s innovations in applying the 
theory of Kulturkampf to legal conflicts over property resources form a 
core element of the Poirean Perspective, and furthers the relevance of 
the Poirean Perspective to property theory. 
The term Kulturkampf originated as a way to describe cultural 
conflict between conservative reaction and liberal politics during the 
Bismarck regime in late nineteenth-century Germany.35  Its use, 
 
 34  Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–78 (1988) 
(outlining the distinction between “crystal” rules in property law and “mud” rules in 
property law).  Mud rules are “fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision” that take into 
account contextual circumstances.  Id. at 578.  
 35  See HELMUT WALSER SMITH, THE CONTINUITIES OF GERMAN HISTORY: NATION, 
RELIGION, RACE ALONG THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (2008) (analyzing historical 
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however, has moved beyond historical debates to describe a normative 
claim that there exists in modern political democracy a clash between 
conservative and liberal perspectives on a range of issues, including the 
structure of gender roles in the family, the proper use of sexuality in 
social relationships, and the role of religion in public life.36 
Prominent legal reliance on the term Kulturkampf (and the ironic 
inspiration of a key element of the Poirean Perspective) emerged out 
of Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Romer v. Evans,37 in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated a statute that prohibited governmental 
entities from passing non-discrimination laws related to sexual 
orientation.. In dissent to a majority opinion, Justice Scalia stated: 
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.  The 
constitutional amendment before us here is not the 
manifestation of a “bare . . . desire to harm” homosexuals, 
ante, at 1628, but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly 
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores 
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise 
those mores through use of the laws.38 
Scalia’s invocation of Kulturkampf provided Marc with a rich 
vocabulary that could be used to describe the underlying cultural 
tensions that animated the ongoing constitutional controversies 
associated with sexual orientation, including the relationship of 
speech and discrimination laws39 and same-sex marriage.40 
This initial descriptive use of Kulturkampf gradually gave way to 
 
debate over Kulturkampf in the twentieth century).  Notably, the question of whether 
Kulturkampf actually occurred during the Bismarck Era is itself contested.  See Margaret 
Lavinia Anderson & Kenneth Barkin, The Myth of the Puttkamer Purge and the Reality of 
the Kulturkampf: Some Reflections of the Histography of Imperial Germany, 54 J. MOD. HIST. 
647–86 (1982). 
 36  Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 297–99.  Marc’s treatment 
of Kulturkampf appears to rely on two potential theoretical origins.  First, Marc 
referenced the work of constitutional scholars such as Jay Michealson, Jack Balkin and 
William Eskridge in their use of Kulturkampf.  See, e.g., Jay Michealson, On Listening to 
the Kulturkampf, or How America Overuled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romers v. Evans 
Didn’t, 49 DUKE L.J. 1599 (2001); Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 
2313 (1997); William Eskridge, Democracy, Kulturkampf and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 419 (1997).  Second, Marc referenced the literature related to political 
science to explore how Kulturkampf was used to describe cultural disagreements in the 
United States.  Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 299.  See, e.g., JAMES 
DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991). 
 37  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996). 
 38  Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jeffrey Shaman, Justice Scalia and the Art 
of the Rhetoric, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 290 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s use of 
foreign phrases as a rhetorical device). 
 39  See generally Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3. 
 40  See generally Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4. 
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the Poirean Perspective’s addition of an innovative normative 
component.  Marc’s central innovation in this area was to embed a 
theory of Kulturkampf into basic property law and its related theory.  
Specifically, Marc modified the theory of Kulturkampf in three key ways: 
tying the theory of Kulturkampf to a theory of property law that 
emphasized how social status itself can be classified as a type of 
property; outlining how specific mechanisms of Kulturkampf are tied to 
real and intangible property concepts; and finally, by emphasizing how 
certain visible actions serve to heighten moral conflicts over property 
resources. 
The Poirean Perspective contends that Kulturkampf conflicts may 
be heightened if the maintenance of “group identity” intertwined with 
a specific property status.  For example, Marc contended that a primary 
motivation for supporters of traditional marriage was to protect the 
status of marriage as a type of property, namely an “intangible sacred 
cultural resource.”41  Cultural property is a “specific form of property 
that enhances identity, understanding, and appreciation for the 
culture that produced the particular property.”42  What if, Marc 
posited, we would recognize that for traditional marriage proponents, 
the status of marriage is a type of cultural property?  If so, in asserting 
that the traditional marriage should be limited to heterosexual 
couples, traditionalists were simply acting as property owners, asserting 
their “right to exclude others” acting so as “to protect sacred objects, 
places, and rituals.”43  Acting as property owners in this regard had the 
ability “to preserve and perpetuate group identity over time.”44  Marc 
concluded that if we understood marriage as a type of property that 
reinforced group identity, a corresponding claim of access would 
provoke a Kulturkampf because such claims of access would likely 
“pollute” the resource of “marital property” itself.45 
The Poirean Perspective’s view that Kulturkampf may intensify 
where social status is granted a property status is consistent with other 
perspectives in critical legal theory that social status can be a type of 
property.  The Poirean Perspective should be read in light of Cheryl 
Harris’s groundbreaking claim in Whiteness as Property, that the racial 
category of whiteness enjoys property status, even under the most 
limited definition of property, since the law “accorded ‘holders’ of 
 
 41  Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 347. 
 42  Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property 
in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569 (1995). 
 43  Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 344. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. at 364. 
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whiteness the same privileges and benefits accorded holders of other 
types of property,” including “the right to transfer or alienability, the 
right to use and enjoyment, and the right to exclude others.”46  Indeed, 
scholarship exists that invokes Kulturkampf in disputes over questions 
of racial identity.  For example, Carla Pratt utilizes Kulturkampf to 
explore the experience of the Seminole Tribe in Florida during the 
1840s over whether to include black slaves as citizens within its claim 
of nationhood.47 
The Poirean Perspective, in this aspect, answers the question of 
why, which has been haunting a coastal elite shocked at the recent 
election of Donald Trump.  Marc’s insight is a simple one: counter-
reaction will be intense if you lose a property right in a group status 
that was once enjoyed by one group over another competing group 
within a given society.48  Indeed, as Daniel Sharfstein has noted that 
social groups may act in violent ways to preserve group-property claims 
or property acquired through status.49  Consequently, counter-reaction 
should be anticipated when social movements, such as those 
advocating for civil and political rights associated with sexual 
orientation, advocate for a change in group-identity generates 
property claims.  For instance,  a Kulterkampf crisis was likely in light of 
the expansion of the right to marry as heterosexual couples acquired 
significant property rights through civil recognition of their marriages, 
including property forms, such as joint tenancy by entirety, or 
community property forms. 
Examining the Poirean Perspective, with its emphasis on 
Kulturkampf triggered by sexual orientation, along with this co-existing 
scholarship on race, adds to property theory, and as this Article 
discusses, supra, intellectual property theory.  To begin with, the 
Poirean Perspective adds to our perspectives regarding how things 
become property, as it tells us that group-identity can acquire certain types 
of property rights.  Adding status to the litany of things like real 
property, intellectual property, and chattel that can be subject to 
property claims is important as we consider the scope and function of 
property law and institutions.  Furthermore, it suggests the ways in 
which progressive property theory can be reformed to accommodate 
 
 46  Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1731 (1993).  
 47  See Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf: The Role of Race Ideology in Constructing 
Native American Identity, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1241 (2005).  
 48  Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 368. 
 49  See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood in Property, 
98 VA. L. REV. 635, 639–40 (2012) (analyzing how claims of property entitlement may 
lead to acts of violence).  
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questions about how social statuses, like race, poverty, gender, and 
sexual orientation, impact the doctrinal formation in property law. 
In many respects, the Poirean Perspective also points to the 
importance of social impact of property re-classification in property 
law.  In other works,50 I have studied what I have termed the disruptive 
origins of property regimes.  The disruptive origin of property regimes 
theory argues that an important origin of individual rights can occur 
when a property regime goes through a radical re-classification of 
property interests within a society.51  An example of such a 
reclassification is the way in which the 13th Amendment can be seen 
as a disruptive moment in American property because this 
Amendment reclassified property—slaves—into citizens.52  The 
Poirean Perspective adds to this story of the disruptive origins of 
property law in its suggestion that significant changes to property are 
likely to prompt significant counter-reactions, particularly if those 
changes within property regimes are accompanied by a reclassification 
of status property.  Kulturkampf becomes a shorthand way of capturing 
the cyclical nature of reaction and counter-reaction in a period of 
significant property reclassification. 
If the Poirean Perspective adds to the theory of Kulturkampf by 
explaining why intra-group conflict exists over a potentially sacred 
group resource, it also deepens the theory of Kulturkampf, by 
explaining where and how such conflicts can emerge and impact 
property law and its respective institutions.  Marc used property theory 
to identify the mechanisms of Kulturkampf.  The mechanisms of place 
and space answer the question of where the politics of Kulturkampf 
emerged, and the mechanisms of visibility and naming explain why 
Kulturkampf creates such intense emotions in its participation. 
The mechanisms of place and space offered Marc a way to 
describe how Kulturkampf emerged at specific times within specific 
political moments.  Place, as defined by Marc, was a physical location 
such as “a building, a beach, a mall, a highway, or an entire town.”53  
The key quality of place, for Marc, was its “ubiety” or more easily said, 
its “whereness.”54  The possibility of ubiety often generates Kulturkampf 
 
 50  Kali Murray, Dispossession at the Center of Property Law, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV. 201, 
207 (2015). 
 51  Id. 
 52  George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1382 (2008). 
 53  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 401. 
 54  Id.  “Ubiety” is “the quality or state of being in a place: such as, the abstract 
quality of being in position: whereness.”  Ubiety, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ubiety (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
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because: 
With ubiety come possibilities for proximity and distance, 
possibilities for access and exclusion, and—importantly for 
an understanding of Kulturkampf—possibilities for the 
control of visibility and choices about ways of being less 
visible or invisible.  Also important is that, in a specific place, 
people will encounter their neighbors and the landscape, 
whether they want to or not.  To one extent or another, 
whatever a geographic place contains in public, whatever 
occurs in a public place, is inescapably visible to others 
present in the place.  So that a place is a particularly 
important kind of arena for engaging potentially unwilling 
others in civic discourse.55 
The experience of place was influenced by the scale of conflict.  
Scale describes the way in which places themselves could range from 
“biggest to small, from worldwide to state-by-state to local to small and 
private.”56 
We can consider the importance of the ubiety of Kulturkampf on 
the intersection of property law and civil rights law in the late 
nineteenth century57 by highlighting the ongoing battles over railroad 
cars in the growing segregation of the United States.  According to 
James Cobb,58 first-class railroad cars served as the crucible of limiting 
public accommodations because it was a location in which “whites had 
little control over their contact with and proximity to blacks.”  
Therefore, first-class railcars became the place of Kulturkampf because 
“white passengers who objected vociferously and sometimes violently 
to sharing the limited confines of the first-class coach with blacks and 
black passengers whose numerous protests and lawsuits reflected their 
refusal to accept anything less than first-class accommodations after 
purchasing a first-class ticket.”59 
All of the primary elements that foster a crisis of Kulturkampf 
presented themselves in the railcar: the presence of a propertied space 
(the privately owned railcar) as well as the disruption caused by the 
visible shifts in the social status of one group that prompted counter 
reaction.  The railroad car, with its jostling of the indignant whites and 
defiant blacks in one physical location, stood in some respects, for the 
 
 55  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 401. 
 56  Id. at 404. 
 57  See generally Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (discussing the battle over public 
accommodations law and its relationship to property law and the right to exclude). 
 58  JAMES COBB, THE BROWN DECISION, JIM CROW, AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 19 (2005).   
 59  Id.   
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moral claims associated with multi-racial democracy after the Civil War.  
Equally important, these were conflicts that were both national in 
scale, as individuals traveled through different states, and local in scale, 
insofar as the laws that addressed these questions could differ from 
state to state.  The dialogical mechanism of the law could create a 
uniform policy, however, because of the differences in the scalar 
function of railroad cars. 
Space serves as the second “where” mechanism of Kulturkampf.  
After defining space “as a field within which humans interact,”60 Marc 
identified three different types of space: place/space, aterritorial 
space, and discursive space.61  Like place, space operates on a range of 
scales, as different types of place/space, aterritorial space, discursive 
space can be experienced from  “biggest to small, from universal fields 
of discourse to fields that encompass only a limited number of 
interacting humans to fields that only encompass a few, then two, then 
just one person.”62 
Place/space is a term Marc used to describe those places that 
hosted formalized, interactive rituals, such as a courtroom, which is a 
physical place in which a trial is conducted.63  For Marc, including a 
definition of place/space encompassed the fact that a physical location 
could also serve a spatial role.  The term “space” could also capture 
those physical locations that served multiple, interactive roles.  For 
instance, in the morning a classroom could serve as teaching space, 
but in the afternoon could serve as a meeting place for a social 
organization such as the Boy Scouts.64  Space could capture the fact 
that “one space can involve numerous places—the space of the Little 
League or the Boy Scouts is wherever the Little League or the Boy 
Scouts meet.”65 
Beyond its meaning embodied in the place/space distinction, the 
term “space” could refer to a non-physical space, what Marc termed 
the “aterritorial field of communicative interaction.”66  A common 
example of such an aterritorial field of communicative interactions 
might be “an Internet dating service as a space without a place, or an 
Internet auction.”67  A less common example of an aterritorial field 
 
 60  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. at 404–05.  
 63  Id. at 402. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402. 
 67  Id. 
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might be a body of individuals that share a set of common religious 
beliefs.68  These aterritorial fields of communicative interactions can 
pose challenges for the Poirean Perspective insofar as such spaces can 
be multi-scalar, since they are simultaneously local, national, and 
international.69  The multi-scalar nature of such aterritorial space 
scrambles the ways in which Kulturkampf might be experienced.  While 
different individuals in a religious community may disagree about 
whether to expand the church membership, Marc noted that 
Kulturkampf conflict may be lessened because exit from the religious 
community may be simpler in those situations in which an actual 
physical space is at issue.70 
Finally, space can refer to what Marc defined as “discursive 
space.”71  Drawing on the work of Madhavi Sunder,72 Marc defined 
discursive space as a space in which ongoing cultural identities are 
formed through active discourse over discourse texts.73  Marc did not 
refer to a specific example of discursive space; however, a paradigmatic 
example of a discursive space is the cultural community that could be 
formed around the publication of a discourse text, such as a book or a 
movie.74  These discursive spaces suggest imagined communities 
connected through the shared experience of reading a book or 
watching a movie.75  The other types of space, place/space, and 
aterritorial communicative space, can reinforce these discursive 
spaces.  A book can be read in a coffeehouse or religious text can be 
shared online.  Discursive space, however, differs because such space 
is organized through the circulation of discourse text, whether in 
physical or non-physical space. 
Discursive space, for Marc, prompted significant Kulturkampf 
conflict for two key reasons.76  First, it permits the formation of 
alternative cultural identities outside of the mainstream norm.  Marc 
directly referenced the pioneering work of Michael Warner in his 
 
 68  Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space, supra note 4, at 324. 
 69  Id. at 325. 
 70  Id. at 326. 
 71  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402.   
 72  Id. (discussing Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of 
Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay-Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 144 (1995)). 
 73  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402. 
 74  See MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS 11–12 (2005) (“[T]he 
notion of a public enables a reflexivity in the circulation of texts among strangers who 
become, by virtue of their reflexively circulating discourse, a social entity.”).  
 75  Id. 
 76  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402. 
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treatment of the relationship between Kulturkampf and discursive 
space.  Expanding on the work of Jürgen Habermas,77 Warner 
introduced the ideas of “publics and counterpublics” into discussion 
of discursive space, by claiming that mainstream publics, a public that 
comes “into being only in relation to texts and their circulation,” was 
central in forming the primary norms of discursive space.78  These 
mainstream publics, according to Warner, are often opposed by 
counterpublics, which are publics that maintain awareness that they 
are subordinate to dominant publics.79  Thus, counterpublics organize 
themselves against a dominant “cultural horizon” in ways that not only 
extend to different ideas or policy outcomes, but also to “the speech 
genres and modes of address that constitute the public or the 
hierarchy among the medium.”80  For Marc, these counterpublics were 
vital to prompting Kulturkampf because such counterpublics provided 
a “horizon of opinion and exchange” which remained “distinct from 
authority, and could create alternative group identity that could 
challenge the status of the mainstream discursive public.”81  Second, 
these counterpublics served as important markers of community for 
the marginalized community and thus could reinforce the newly 
empowered social identity.82 
The relationship between the mechanisms of place and space and 
their relationship to Kulturkampf has several consequences for property 
theory.  First, Marc’s focus on the mechanisms of place, space, and to 
a lesser extent, scale, is consistent with his “thick” conception of 
community insofar as Kulturkampf crises in property law emerge from 
an attempt to reconcile binary property norm, as well as conflicting 
cultural frames.  Bearing down on place and space conflicts furthers 
this project of understanding how context is a necessary element of 
property theory.  Second, it suggests why Kulturkampf conflicts differ, 
perhaps, in their intensity.  The disputes become so devastating in the 
construction of social identities because such disputes are tied to the 
 
 77  The basic definition for “public sphere” was initially outlined by Jürgen 
Habermas.  See Jürgen Habermas, The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article, 3 NEW GER. 
CRITIQUE 49 (1964).   
 78  WARNER, supra note 74, at 66. 
 79  Id. at 119.  
 80  Id.  An example of a counterpublic is the movement of the Riot Grrls, which 
not only opposed dominant norms of female identity, but also created alternative 
spaces of communication such as handmade magazines (often referred to as ‘zines) to 
create different mediums of communication.  Catherine Driscoll, Girl Culture, Revenge 
and Global Capitalism: Cybergirls, Riot Grrls, Spice Girls, 14 AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD. 173, 
177–80 (1999). 
 81  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 403. 
 82  Id. 
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“very ground” of the dispute.  Finally, the mechanisms of space and 
place explain why property law and theory was so central to Marc’s 
treatment of Kulturkampf.  Property law is where law attempts to 
manage how we interact with local, neighborly space, and moreover, 
property law encourages on-the-ground, social institutions that can 
manage social conflict. 
The Poirean Perspective also addresses how Kulturkampf can occur 
around property resources.  The Poirean Perspective suggests that 
Kulturkampf emerges out of a process where formerly marginalized 
groups become “visible” in specific places and spaces.  Marc noted that 
“visibility is key to the process of changing informal social norms, and 
thus, eventually being able to address and change legal norms.”83  Marc 
claimed that increased visibility for formerly marginalized groups 
occurred through what he termed “microperformances of identity.”84  
Adopted from the pioneering work of Erving Goffman on presentation 
of self through microinteractions,85 Marc argued that 
microperformances of identity occur when an individual undertakes 
small interpersonal interactions, “everyday performances of self” 
directed towards social audience.86  In engaging in these 
microperformances of identity, an individual and the respective social 
audience engage in mutually reinforcing behavioral cues around these 
everyday performances of self.87 
Visibility for formerly marginalized groups becomes possible 
when such groups begin to challenge and even misappropriate these 
behavioral cues.  Marc contended that the “misappropriation” of these 
visual cues “has the potential to shift the significance and therefore the 
identity-revealing and reproducing potential of specific behaviors and 
traits, and thus eventually to shift and restructure the larger system of 
socially-relevant identity categories to which identity-representing and 
(re) producing behaviors refer.”88  In his scholarly work, Marc traced 
how microperformances of identity engaged in by the LGBT 
community in New Jersey in a variety of different contexts, including 
opening gay bars, ordering sexual literature, and challenging public 
accommodations and employment discrimination, led to successive 
 
 83  Id. at 405. 
 84  Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 4, at 5. 
 85  Marc reviewed a number of works in development of the theory of the 
microperformances of identity.  See id. at 5 n.6. 
 86  Id. at 5. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at 5–6. 
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legal challenges.89  These successive legal challenges, then, served as 
the primary basis for a successful challenge to ensure marital benefits 
for this community.90  Kulturkampf, however, is generated in these 
circumstances because while disruptive microperformances of identity 
were necessary strategies for more visibility of marginalized 
communities, these disruptive microperformances implicate long-
standing moral and cultural norms, thus prompting a likely counter-
reaction. 
Place and space provide a crucial forum for these 
microperformances since, as Marc noted, 
[A]ny gathering place—a bar or hotel or barracks—can 
become a space of interactions that create, support and 
reaffirm a certain kind of identity, or that, on the other hand, 
suppress it.  Communications in the press—a space without 
a place—become another kind of field of recognition and 
interaction.91 
The centrality of place and space in providing forums for visibility 
challenges means that property law in the Poirean Perspective, then, 
becomes a crucial mediation tool for managing these fraught 
interactions.  Trespass becomes a vehicle to manage unwanted access 
claims by marginalized groups.  Public and private nuisance actions 
can be brought against place/space such as African-American 
churches or gay bars.  Covenants become a way to manage an increase 
in the presence of a marginalized community in a particular 
neighborhood.  These doctrines become vehicles for managing the 
ways in which place and space form the Kulturkampf. 
II.  TRADEMARK LAW IN THE TIME OF KULTURKAMPF 
This Part considers the pragmatic impact of the Poirean 
Perspective by applying it to one factual scenario: the existence of 
racially stigmatizing trademarks such as the Washington Redskins.  
While a live controversy is before Supreme Court as to whether Section 
(2)(a) of the Lanham Act of 1946 can bar such marks under the First 
Amendment, this Article will consider the controversies in light of the 
Poirean Perspective, as outlined infra.  While the scholarly debate over 
the validity of racially disparaging trademarks is an intense one,92 the 
 
 89  Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality, supra note 
4, at 300–09. 
 90  Id. at 321–27 (discussing marital litigation in New Jersey). 
 91  Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 406. 
 92  Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and 
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007) (arguing “the current 
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Poirean Perspective is useful because it helps explain why the 
relationships between trademarks, place, and social conflict generates 
moments of Kulturkampf. 
This Part first explores the existence of what Marc termed the 
community brand and why such brands embody the dialogical tension 
described in his scholarship.  Next, this Part examines how the current 
controversy over racially stigmatizing marks derives from the 
relationship of community brands to the overall mechanism of 
 
prohibition on registering scandalous trademarks largely serves no purpose and 
represents a challenge to First Amendment considerations”); Mark S. Nagel & Daniel 
A. Rascher, Washington “Redskins” – Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: Legal and 
Economic Issues Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 789, 803 (2006) (reasoning that the failure of the Washington Redskins to 
change their trademark might be due to how economically valuable it is, therefore the 
best recourse might be to compensate the team for a potential name change); Gavin 
Clarkson, Racial Imagery and Native Americans: A First Look at the Empirical Evidence Behind 
the Indian Mascot Controversy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 401 (2003) 
(proposing that all racial Indian mascots be eliminated and allow tribes to trademark 
their identities and license them when the tribe feels it is culturally appropriate to do 
so); Rachel Clark Hughey, The Impact of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark 
Protection of Other Marks, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 365 (2003) 
(“Although it is debatable whether a majority of Native Americans find the use of 
Native American mascots, logos, and names offensive within the necessary definition 
for trademark law, it is a fact that many Native Americans, and other non-Native 
Americans, do find the uses insulting.”); Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of the 
Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for 
Words that Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 438 (2001) (arguing that Section 2(a) of 
the Lanham Act “does not represent an unconstitutional condition” and that it is 
appropriate for the government to protect minorities from disparaging trademarks); 
Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Renaming the Redskins (and the Florida State Seminoles?): The 
Trademark Registration Decision and Alternative Remedies, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 304–
08 (1999) (offering alternative legal remedies to pursue for trademarks that Native 
Americans would consider disparaging and recommending the Washington Redskins 
change their name to recapture the goodwill of Native Americans); Kristin E. 
Behrendt, Cancellation of the Washington Redskins’ Federal Trademark Registrations: Should 
Sports Team Names, Mascots and Logos Contain Native American Symbolism?, 10 SETON HALL 
J. SPORT L. 389, 414 (2000) (“A nationwide movement to abolish racially discriminatory 
team symbols will help both professional and nonprofessional sports to promote team 
players, positive attitudes, team talent and athletic ability.”); Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does 
the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 707–08 (2000) 
(arguing that commercial free speech protection for the use of the Washington 
Redskins trademark does not apply because an affiliatory mark has little to no 
informational content); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and The Doctrine 
of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 12–14 
(1994) (describing that Native American groups have long claimed that the 
Washington Redskins’ trademark is a racial epithet and have made many legal and 
non-legal attempts to alter the name of the team); Bruce C. Kelber, “Scalping the 
Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native American Nicknames And 
Images On The Road To Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 533, 536 (1994) (arguing 
that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act can provide protection for Native American 
groups who are offended by disparaging marks).  
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Kulturkampf.  This Part concludes by analyzing how the Poirean 
Perspective will yield pragmatic solutions that could resolve these 
conflicts. 
A. Community Brands and Kulturkampf 
Trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights, are not protected 
under the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution93 since nominally trademarks do not have a creator such 
as an author or inventor.94  One could potentially assign creative credit 
to the designer of the mark but such creative credit does not extend to 
the intangible association (“goodwill”), which associates the mark with 
a source of product.95  Modern trademark law has typically assigned the 
claim of creativity to the trademark owner, arguably to its detriment.  
This creativity, notes Keith Aoki, typically rests upon justification that 
seeks to protect the labor-effect of the trademark owner.96 
A reading of the Poirean Perspective suggests that imprecision in 
trademark law occurs because the law seeks a dialogical balance 
between the labor-creation effort of the trademark owner and the 
consuming public’s effort in giving associative meaning to the 
trademark.  The Poirean Perspective is consistent with other 
scholarship in this area.  For instance, Stephen Wilf has emphasized 
that trademark creation should be considered an act of joint 
authorship between the trademark owner and the public.97  Wilf 
suggests that: 
Trademark creation is a two-step process.  First, a producer 
affixes a symbol to the product.  Second, the public associates 
the symbol with the product.  The producer affixing a symbol 
 
 93  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 94  Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (“Any attempt, however, to 
identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in 
the arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show that the effort is 
surrounded with insurmountable difficulties.  The ordinary trade-mark has no 
necessary relation to invention or discovery.  It is often the result of accident rather 
than design, and when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by 
registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way 
essential to the right conferred by that act.”). 
 95 Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property 
and the Public Domain––Part II, 18 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 191, 242  (1994).  
 96  Id. at 242 (“Precisely because traditionally there has been no authorial, inventive 
figure in trademark to justify the grant of intellectual property rights, aspects of 
author––and inventor––reasoning have surreptitiously seeped into trademark law.  
Traces of authorship have been ascribed to the trademark owner who has invested her 
‘sweat of the brow’ to ‘create’ value in a mark, so that she is looked upon as being 
legally entitled and justified in ‘reaping what she has sown.’”).  
 97  Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1999).   
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might be called primary meaning while secondary meaning 
embodies the idea of public association.  This association 
takes place in the midst of a market where linguistic 
exchange parallels the transfer of goods.  Both the producer 
and the consuming public are joint authors.98 
This joint act, however, is not simply authorship in the traditional 
sense.  In a previous work,99 I have argued that the text which 
accompanies the disclosure of a patent as an intermediated text serves 
as a representative of an imagined social world from which an 
invention derived. 
Arguably, the trademark serves an equally representative effect, 
but in a different way.  Unlike patents, trademarks have a 
representative effect insofar as trademarks are representative of the 
actual shared social worlds between the producer and the consuming 
public.100  If we extend the Poirean Perspective to the representative 
effect of trademark, we can see the constant dialogical tension between 
production and association in trademark as a constant thematic 
element of this area of law.  This shared public creativity is at the heart 
of a functional trademark law. 
Typically, modern trademark law has ascribed a relatively narrow 
definition to the type of shared worlds in which we see the 
representative effect of trademarks applied to the shared worlds of 
consumers and producers in the modern marketplace.  Initially, 
trademark law sought to be responsive to how different consumers 
reacted to specific functions of the trademarks.101  Recently, however, 
scholars have claimed individuals may have a different relationship to 
the act of trademark creativity, thus shifting the trademark’s 
relationship to shared worlds of cultural meaning.  The shifting social 
meanings of trademarks in a variety of different shared social worlds 
have prompted scholars to reevaluate the functions of trademark law.  
For instance, Sonia Katyal has recently referred to the intersectional 
demands placed on trademark law,102 given its joint role in regulating 
 
 98  Id.  
 99  KALI MURRAY, THE POLITICS OF PATENT LAW: CRAFTING THE PARTICIPATORY PATENT 
BARGAIN 22–25 (2013). 
 100  Charles Lemert defines a shared social world, including “everything obviously 
includes everything that constitutes the collective life of groups of people, up to and 
including societies—their economies, their politics, their shared mental things, their 
culture, and more.”  CHARLES LEMERT, SOCIAL THINGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE 118 (2d ed. 2002). 
 101  Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 818 (1927).  
 102  See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601 (2010). 
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what she terms a marketplace of goods and a marketplace of ideas.103  
For Katyal, trademark’s intersectionality is key to its functional nature 
as an area of legal analysis because while trademarks are “commodities 
in one sense, they are also expressions in another, to both the 
markholder that owns them and to the public that perceives them, and 
the law inherits the responsibility of navigating a trademark’s potential 
contradiction between its status as corporate property and as cultural 
icon.”104 
The Poirean Perspective adds to this dialogue about the 
representative effect of trademarks, by exploring how trademarks and 
associated brands that had particularly rich connections to cultural 
conflicts over group identities such as sexual orientation and race.  In 
his own work, Marc advanced an understanding of trademark law and 
its application to one specific set of brands, which he termed community 
brands.  As defined by Marc, community brands are brands that use 
“[t]rademark (and other exclusion mechanisms) to serve (sometimes) 
to manage the personal and community identity traits that 
consumption of the brand confers on consumers.”105  The community 
brand represents an intense form the dialogical function of a 
trademark.  The producer of the trademark has created the symbol or 
set of marks (“the brand”) that is associated with a particular image of 
a group identity, and the mark acquires a significant public association 
with those values, since the public itself engages in the separate 
identity-producing activities that reinforce the meaning of the mark.106  
The consumption of the community brand is the source of the group-
identity and an independent social identity emerges from that 
consumption.107 
As an initial matter, Marc likely intended that the term 
“community brand” be distinguishable from mainstream trademark 
law, which does protect some categories of group identity.  For 
instance, Section 1127 of the Lanham Act permits “group-identity” to 
be protected through collective marks, which are those marks used by 
the “the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective 
 
 103  Id. at 1606. 
 104  Id. at 1612.  
 105  Marc R. Poirier, Why the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump: Trademark, Identity, 
Localism, and the Governance of an Anti-Gay Brand, Slide 51 (Feb. 12, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review) [hereinafter Why 
the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump].  I have reconstructed my discussion of community brands 
from this unpublished manuscript of the speech Marc delivered at Marquette 
University Law School in 2014, as well as personal discussions with Marc.  
 106  Id. at Slide 81.  
 107  Id. at Slide 83.  
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group or organization,”108 or certification marks, which are those marks 
that certify that the “work or labor on the goods or services was 
performed by members of a union or other organization, or collective 
marks.”109  The community brand is distinct from these protected 
“group-identity” marks.  A “community brand” builds a distinct 
identity, whereas collective or certification marks actually protect pre-
existing social identities, such as a fraternity or a trade association.  
Thus, the community brand builds itself through an associative bond 
with its consuming public.  The consumption of the community brand 
is the source of the group-identity and an independent social identity 
emerges from that consumption.110 
Furthermore, the community brand fosters an intense bond with 
the public, generally, and its members because the brand owner can 
practice exclusion mechanisms that operate in tandem with the 
activities of the organization that are strengthening the independent 
social identity of the group.  For instance, the brand owner can exclude 
other types of individuals from group-reproducing activities, such as 
parades, or can exclude members who do not meet the relevant social 
identity of the brand.111  Marc theorized that these exclusion 
mechanisms, in addition to the existence of the trademark itself, 
operated to increase the intensity of the group-identity bond formed 
by the community brand in three key ways.  First, the community brand 
becomes more than a consumer consumption decision; rather, it 
“becomes a life-long, sometimes generations-long, identity and 
affiliation.”112  Second, the community brand itself is often the only 
alternative in the respective market.113  Finally, the community band is 
a particularly powerful brand, since while an individual may want to 
reject association with discriminatory elements of the community 
brand, to do so would to be to reject a larger social identity.114 
The Boy Scouts of America, for Marc, served as a paradigmatic 
example of community brand.115  The official organization, the Boy 
Scouts of America, created and managed its brand through a series of 
acquired trademarks, while simultaneously its membership developed 
an intense public affiliation with the brand fostered most 
 
 108  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2016) (definition of “collective mark”).  
 109  Id. (definition of certification mark). 
 110  Marc Poirier, Why the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump, supra note 105, at Slide 66. 
 111  Id. at Slide 67. 
 112  Id. at Slide 81. 
 113  Id. at Slide 80. 
 114  Id. at Slide 81. 
 115  Id. at Slides 52–53. 
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fundamentally through its youth education programs, as well as its 
branded materials (which included uniforms, outdoor gear and brand 
indicia).  These branded materials worked to create an independent 
social identity that emerged from that consumption. 
For Marc, the independent social identity of the Boy Scouts of 
America emerged primarily as a homo-social, heteronormative group 
identity due to substantial changes in traditional masculinity in late 
nineteenth-century United States.  In Hastening the Kulturkampf,116 Marc 
noted: 
The issue of masculinity was at the heart of the BSA from its 
founding.  As explored by Jeffrey Hantover, the period from 
1880 to World War I was one in which opportunities for the 
development and expression of a traditional masculinity 
were being limited by widespread social changes.  The causes 
included urbanization, the increased emphasis on the 
connection between mother and son due to changes in 
family size and structure (including absence of servants), the 
absence of fathers from the home, the expansion of the 
public high school, the increasing sedentariness and 
feminization of many jobs, and the development of a new age 
category of adolescence marked by dependency and 
inactivity.117 
In response to these societal changes, the Boy Scouts, over the 
course of the twentieth century, emphasized activities, uniforms, and 
social activities that fostered an ideal masculine social identity.118  The 
community brand of the Boys Scouts of America, thus fostered a 
crucial group-identity.  Consequently, it made challenge to the 
meaning of the community brand difficult as it deemed a rejection of 
the social identity represented by the Boy Scouts of America.  
Furthermore, no equivalent alternative program existed as 
competition for the Boy Scouts of America since this affinitive group 
was a “national symbol, a tradition” and consequently, had the status 
of a “shared, intangible[,] cultural property.”119 
Moreover, as Marc further suggested, the official organization of 
the Boy Scouts engaged in other exclusionary actions as an element of 
maintaining this homo-social, heteronormative group identity.  For 
instance, the organization prohibited gay male individuals from 
serving as Scout Leaders for individual local organizations and 
 
 116  Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 314–15. 
 117  Id. at 313. 
 118  See Poirier, Why the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump, supra note 105, at Slide 55.  
 119  Id. at Slide 80. 
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furthermore, acted to exclude former members, who later revealed a 
homosexual orientation.120  This exclusion served to reinforce the 
harms that might emerge from a perceived pollution of the social 
identity of this community brand.121 
A second conclusion to be drawn as to community brands, 
consistent with the Poirean Perspective, is that the intensity of the 
associative bond may engender a Kulturkampf over maintaining the 
social identity created through the consumption of the brand.  The 
mechanisms that engender Kulturkampf are more likely to be present 
with regard to a community brand.  Initially, community brands may 
implicate the physical locations of a place or the diverse types of spaces 
(place/space, aterritorial, or discursive spaces) identified within the 
Poirean Perspective.  Likewise, the development of alternative social 
identities that engage in the shared world of the brand may engender 
internal and later, external critiques of the community fostered by the 
trademark owner and the dominant social identity associated with the 
brand. 
Again, the Boys Scouts of America offer a rich example of this 
process of Kulturkampf.  The Boy Scouts of America are organized in a 
series of local chapters, and such chapters meet in a variety of physical 
locations, including churches, schools, and local neighborhoods.  
Thus, it was likely to cause significant disruption if such identity was 
challenged since the social identity of the brand was strengthened by 
its locational ties to particular neighborhoods and places.  The process 
of change after the Boy Scouts of America explicitly affirmed its anti-
gay exclusion in the early 1990s, was, as Marc noted, “local and, most 
importantly, personal.  Individual parents must confront the 
implications of their membership decisions, provoking what could be 
thought of as a household-by-household reflection on the antigay 
exclusion.”122  The type of moral calculus that prompts Kulturkampf is 
further intensified given these deeply personal, localized decisions. 
Additionally, the emergence of visible alternative social identities 
is facilitated by the ability of local chapters to undertake external 
critiques of the social identity consumed through the community 
brand.  For instance, after the Boy Scouts of America’s explicit 
endorsement of the anti-gay exclusion, local chapters across the 
country challenged the exclusion.  This local ferment led the Boy 
Scouts of America to change its anti-gay policy in May 2015.123  
 
 120  Id. at Slide 82. 
 121  Id. at Slide 78. 
 122  Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 322. 
 123  Robert Gates, National Business Meeting Remarks, BOY SCOUTS OF AM. (May 21, 
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Significant internal critique by the local chapters appears to be a 
crucial determination in the decision to modify the policies.  As noted 
by Robert Gates, the then-volunteer President of the Boy Scouts: 
We cannot ignore growing internal challenges to our current 
membership policy, from some councils—like the greater 
New York Council, the Denver Area Council, and others—in 
open defiance of the policy, to more and more councils 
taking a position in their mission statements and public 
documents contrary to national policy.124 
The critique of the brand was fostered through access to 
discursive spaces, such as mission statements.  This local critique 
undermined the singular message of the national brand, thus the 
national brand—and resulting social identity—had to be reconstituted 
in new ways. 
The existing community brand offers significant lessons for both 
intellectual property and property theory.  The first lesson is the way 
that property and intellectual property claims are intertwined in the 
relationship of the community brand.  An almost mystical concept in 
trademark theory is how the public begins to associate the source of 
the product with a specific brand.  The community brand, much like 
the dissolution of meaning that occurs when a mark becomes generic, 
provides an opportunity to examine why individuals attached social 
meaning to a signifying mark.  What has become apparent through the 
Poirean Perspective are the ways in which the markers of the shared 
world—the physical locations or the consumed discourse of an 
organization—offer us a way to see in which a brand is built and 
sustains meaning.  The Poirean Perspective’s emphasis on the ubiety of 
brand brings a necessary element of tangibility to how we see a brand 
being built over time.  The second lesson offered by the Poirean 
Perspective is its relationship to the disruptive origins of property law.  
A key disruptive origin of property rights is a change in social status of 
a formerly marginalized community.  A Kulturkampf crisis in a 
community brand offers us a way to think about how to effectively 
approach resolution of Kulturkampf process.  For instance, in the case 
of the Boy Scouts of America, we can see how managing the brand itself 
provided a communicative medium to think through a reformed social 
identity. 
 
2015), http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/DR-GATES-RE 
MARKS.pdf. 
 124  Id. at 12–13.  
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B.  A Kulturkampf Brand: The Washington Redskins 
Contemplating a sports brand such as the Washington Redskins, 
it could be said that all sports brands are nominally community brands.  
Sports fandom is consistent with Marc’s claim of how community 
brands are formed.  As C. Christopher King notes, the shared social 
worlds of sports of “pleasure and longing,” formed through “the 
[community] of the crowd,” are “ubiquitous features of everyday life” 
that are “uniquely meaningful and powerful” for its participants.125  
Moreover, such a fan affiliation can be a social identity that 
consumption of the brand conferred on consumers and their 
respective communities.  The primary marks of communities are 
present since fan affiliation is often a long-term commitment, a 
perception may exist that little or no alternative option exists, and 
rejecting that social identity may be painful in the long term. 
I suspect, however, that Marc would suggest that the term 
community brand should be understood in a narrower manner.  
Specifically, community brands are those brands that are subject to a 
lack of consensus over the meaning of a particular social identity that 
is attached to a particular brand.  Analyzing a community brand such 
as the Washington Redskins suggests the ways community brands differ 
from other comparable brands that also foster affinity bonds.  Indeed, 
the evolution of Washington Redskins brand highlights the way it was 
distinguished from other sports brands, including even those sports 
brands that used Native American imagery.126 
The legal and historical literature on the Washington Redskins is 
extensive,127 and this Part will not review it in length; instead, it will 
focus on the ways in which the Washington Redskins are consistent 
 
 125  C. Richard King, Preoccupations and Prejudices: Reflections on the Study of Sports 
Imagery, 46 ANTHROPOLOGICA 29, 31–32 (2004). 
 126  J. Gordon Hylton, Before the Redskins Were the Redskins: The Use of Native American 
Team Names in the Formative Era of American Sports, 1857–1933, 86 N.D. L. REV. 879, 902 
(2010) (comparing previous use of Native American team imagery to the racialized 
use of the Washington Redskins). 
 127  See supra note 92.  See also Cameron Smith, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Washington 
Redskins: Intellectual Property Rights in “Scandalous” and “Disparaging” Trademarks After 
Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 77 WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1296–97 (2002) (arguing “that the 
liberal standing requirements for opposition and cancellation proceedings, combined 
with Harjo’s expansive disparagement doctrine, impermissibly conflict with the 
protections afforded commercial speech and the policies underlying federal 
trademark regulation”); André Douglas Pond Cummings, “Lions and Tigers and Bears, 
Oh My” or “Redskins and Braves and Indians, Oh Why”: Ruminations on McBride v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, Political Correctness, and the Reasonable Person, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 
11, 26–31 (1999) (arguing that when determining if a mark is offensive and 
disparaging it is improper to use the reasonable person standard because it draws from 
the general public and no the offended minority). 
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with the Poirean Perspective’s interest in community brands.  A key 
marker of the community brand is its connection to a deeply 
constructed, yet contested, social identity that is generated through the 
consumption of a trademark and corresponding affiliative brands.  Pro 
Football, Inc., the current owner of the Washington Redskins, has a 
number of assigned trademarks in the term and related image of a 
Native American itself128 as well as a number of affiliated marks. 
Moreover, this trademark ownership was accompanied by a 
number of exclusionary mechanisms that fostered a contested social 
identity in the brand.  For example, the Redskins were early innovators 
in professional football in fostering the intense affiliation experience, 
including adding cheerleaders, a team band, and a fight song.129  This 
affiliation, notably, intersected with explicit, racialized imagery of 
Native Americans that was, even for its time, unusual.130  C. Christopher 
King131 notes that George Marshall, the founder of the Redskins, 
created an intense affiliative experience: 
He did this in part by making game day a spectacle, bigger 
than a contest between two football teams, with every 
element saturated with an Indian motif.  His initial logo 
featured the profile of an Indian warrior, inspired by the 
Indian Head nickel, which was still in circulation.  He also 
choose [sic] team colors, burgundy and gold, meant to 
accentuate the redness of the moniker.  And as noted above, 
he created a band to attract a wider audience, dressing them 
in feathers.  Late in his tenure as owners, the Redskinettes, 
attaching to its tableau the perpetuation of sexualized 
stereotypes of American Indian women.132 
Here, the racialized imagery of the Washington Redskins, as well 
as the affiliated brand itself, worked to cement the bond between the 
predominately white audience and its owner, thus evoking nostalgia 
for a “glorified white order” that served as a key element of the early 
social identity that generated through the Redskins brand.133 
Such a creation of a social identity was deliberate, insofar as it 
 
 128  The current owner of the Washington Redskins, Pro Football Inc., is the 
assignee of numerous trademarks that reference the term or image of the Redskins.  
See, e.g., DREAM WORLD SERIES, Registration No. 836,112; WASHINGTON 
REDSKINS, Registration No. 978,824; WASHINGTON REDSKINS, Registration No. 
986,668.  
 129  C. RICHARD KING, REDSKINS: INSULT AND BRAND 34 (2015). 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. at 34. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
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sought to exclude groups outside of that racialized white order.134  
Throughout the era of late segregation from the 1950s until 1970s, the 
Redskins fostered a brand identity that explicitly appealed to white 
Southerners during segregation.  For instance, the Redskins were the 
last team to integrate its team and only did so in response to federal 
governmental pressure.135  Over time, the racialized appeal of the 
Redskins became more complicated when Congress granted 
Washington, D.C, democratic autonomy in the late 1970s and 1980s.136  
This shift permitted the Redskins to become a symbol of unified racial 
order between black and white citizens in the city.137  This racial 
reconciliation was complicated by the use of the racialized image of 
the Redskin itself. 
Understanding the Redskins as a community brand is different 
from discussing it as a trademark.  The community brand, as discussed 
in the Poirean Perspective, occurs where the brand’s construction of 
social identity is reinforced through its relationship to specific places, 
both in their physical and social characteristics.  The community brand 
of the Redskins is amplified through its ongoing relationship to a 
specific place.  Preliminarily, the social identity of the brand is fortified 
through the experience of the stadium as place.  As John Bale and 
Christian Gaffney note, the experience of attending a game in the 
physical location is a deeply sensory experience that implicates sound, 
sight, smell and memory.138  Bale and Gaffney note that “the sense of 
historical continuity as well as the sense of participating in history is a 
powerful component of the stadium experience.  The stadium can be 
read as a historical text, not only in terms of the events that have 
transpired there but in architectural terms as well.”139 
This deeply sensory experience deepens the affinitive bond of the 
consuming public to the community brand.  Moreover, the stadium 
operates as a place/space because of the ritualized elements of games 
 
 134  Id. 
 135  See, e.g., ANDREW O’TOOLE, FIGHT FOR OLD DC: GEORGE PRESTON MARSHALL, THE 
INTEGRATION OF THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS, AND THE RISE OF A NEW NFL (2016) 
(discussing the integration of the Washington Redskins); THOMAS G. SMITH, 
SHOWDOWN: JFK AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS (2011) 
(discussing the integration of the Washington Redskins). 
 136  See generally HARRY S. JAFFE & TOM SHERWOOD, DREAM CITY: RACE, POWER AND THE 
DECLINE OF WASHINGTON D.C. (20th ed. 2014) (discussing the aftermath of the grant 
of “home rule” in the politics of Washington, D.C.). 
 137  Brett Williams, The South in the City, 16 J. POPULAR CULTURE 30, 30–41 (1982) 
(discussing the role of the Redskins in common culture). 
 138  John Bale & Christian Gaffney, Sensing the Stadium, in SITES OF SPORTS: SPACE, 
PLACE AND EXPERIENCE 25–37 (Patricia Vertinsky & John Bale eds., 2004). 
 139  Id. at 37. 
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that take place in its environs, thus involving fans in another affinitive 
bond.140  This socialized relationship to brand makes it difficult to 
break the affinitive bond with the mark itself, and indeed, produces a 
reaction that is likely to lead to a Kulturkampf conflict. 
In addition, a community brand can be distinguished from a 
trademark insofar as its associative meaning is subject to significant 
cultural contest within a discursive space.  Discursive space is 
particularly relevant to the community brand since a trademark, like a 
patent or copyright, is a text that circulates through a public.141  
Destabilizing the shared meaning of a text itself, consequently, can 
function as a particularly effective tool in a Kulturkampf conflict.  For 
example, in 2014, the National Congress of American Indians 
produced and circulated an advertisement, entitled “Proud to Be 
Indian” that sought to portray a series of Native Americans in their 
everyday professional lives in an implicit critique of the racialized 
image of the Redskins.142 
Notably, in offering visual counter-images to the racialized image 
of the Redskins, this advertisement is a particularly complex use of a 
visibility strategy identified by the Poirean Perspective as the 
microperformance of identity.  Marc stressed that formerly 
marginalized groups acted to shift cultural and legal mores, by 
performing small, interpersonal interactions that challenged the 
dominant behavioral cues.  The “Proud to be Indian” advertisement is 
itself is a dramatized performance of a series of everyday performances 
of self.  We have, in the ad, a powerful performance of what Marc 
referred to as visibility, an act that prompts a reevaluation of social 
status.  This doubling of performance embeds the moral critique of 
the Redskins’s community brand because it attacks the social identity 
that is represented by the brand: it fights the claim of 
representativeness offered by the trademark and its associated 
exclusionary mechanisms. 
 
 140  Patricia Anne Masters, Play Theory, Playing, and Culture, 2 SOC. COMPASS 856–69 
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CONCLUSION 
Reconstructing the Poirean Perspective’s specific meaning from 
Marc’s published and unpublished writings has been a bittersweet 
experience for me.  However, I am confident that the lasting lessons of 
the Poirean Perspective suggest that I will always be talking in some 
sense to Marc as I consider the ways in which his ideas will provide me 
with so many ways to think about three key ideas in property and 
intellectual property theory. 
First, the Poirean Perspective helps us to understand the ways in 
which social identity can become a “property” thing that generates a 
corresponding set of property rights.  The Poirean Perspective, along 
with the work of critical race theorists, such as Cheryl Harris, suggests 
that we must consistently include identity in the taxonomy of property 
“things” such as real property and chattels.  Second, the insights of the 
Poirean Perspective reinforce the relationship between the intellectual 
property and intellectual property law.  The community brand draws 
its power from the ways in which the experience of place and space is 
reinforced by the intangible qualities of the trademark.  Finally, the 
Poirean Perspective adds to our understanding of how social change 
impacts the development of property law.  The crisis of Kulturkampf is 
linked intimately to the ways in which conflicts over social identity 
result in corresponding shifts in the development of property law. 
These three key ideas, in many respects, do not even fully capture 
what I have even discussed in this Article.  Perhaps, this suggests the 
enduring effect of generosity of Marc’s scholarly idea; I am grateful 
that you have given us so many more ideas to pursue, my friend. 
 
